Within the past decade United States involvement in the Middle East increased along with our interaction with Iran, a country that seeks to play a dominate role within the region and whose interests at times conflict with U.S. interests. The United States struggled in its attempt to engage Iran through a number of venues and players with limited success. This paper examines ways to engage Iran from a cultural appreciation of both nations. To provide a recent historical context, this paper briefly examines the relationship between Iran and the U.S. over the last fifty years, focusing on some of the successes and failures. It then addresses Iranian involvement in support of terrorism and the drive to acquire nuclear weapons, two key issues that dominate today's geopolitical agenda. To provide a cultural foundation for later recommendations on how best to engage Iran, it discusses how Iranians communicate and negotiate. After briefly identifying key cultural aspects of how Americans communicate and negotiate, this paper offers four broad recommendations on ways to strategically negotiate and communicate with Iranians through a more informed cultural understanding.
THE IMPACT OF CULTURE: COMMUNICATING WITH IRAN
At no time in history has U.S. involvement in the Middle East been as extensive and complex as it is today. No other region in the world affects U.S. policy and the lives of Americans in such a way as the Middle East, ranging from affecting the lives of families whose loved ones die in Iraq to the price paid for a gallon of gasoline. The Middle East is ethnically and culturally diverse, dynamic, and volatile, which in total can be beyond the comprehension and understanding of many Americans. At the epicenter of this region is the state of Iran, historically known as Persia, which once was an impressive empire that predates the birth of Christianity, Alexander the Great, and the Roman Empire. In addition to occupying the geographic center of this region, Iran wields a high degree of political power throughout and affects geopolitical events well beyond the region. One could argue that although Iran is not the center of gravity with respect to U.S. policy in the region, it plays a decisive role. 1 The role Iran plays exerts influence within the region that is not always congruent with the goals and policies of the United States and its allies. In fact, Iranian internal and external behavior has significant second and third order effects on U.S. regional geopolitical goals and policies. 2 Iran is located in the geographic center of a region, that struggles with a plethora of geopolitical issues, all of which to some degree directly or potentially affect its future security. To the east is Afghanistan, a fractured state of warlords, drugs, and religious zealots that has a NATO lead coalition seeking to stabilize the government while encouraging the growth of that country's fledging democratic institutions. To the southeast of Iran is a nuclear Pakistan, a fractured political state fueled by internal ethnic and religious strife that also has a fragile peace with nuclear India. Secondly, Iranians see themselves as Shiite, which can be characterized as victims of an unjust world. In terms of being Shiite, Iranians have a fatalistic view; they perceive themselves as victims of a world in which the strong always exploit the weak.
In addition, Iranian culture places a great deal of emphasis on the Shiite concept of duality of man, the purity of the inner self and the corruption of the external self. The inner self is the center of all that is good and pure in the world. As such, it is the center of humility, compassion, generosity, and trust in God. The external self is worldly, suspicion, cynical, pessimistic and defeatist; those things that reflect a lack of trust in
God. Ideally, one should combat the latter traits and be the person in which both the internal and external self are in harmony, by strict obedience to God. 25 Both concepts could pose advantages to those negotiating with Iranians. With respect to the former, one could play on Iranian fears in terms of reaching a negotiated settlement. For example, one could convince the Iranian interlocutors that no matter what they do they will not achieve a favorable outcome so they should be pragmatic and accept any offer.
In the case of the latter, one could appeal to the Iranian inner self, by emphasizing it is
God's will to reach a settlement. mistrust of stability; mistrust of verbal communications by others; the expectation that others will try to manipulate; lack of belief in altruism; exploitation by government of people; and that nothing can change for the better. 28 Based on these mistrustful notions of leaders and of the world in general, many
Iranians see life as a game of chance. In essence, they expect the worst from people and less from individuals in high office. Chance is paramount, and the skill of the individual is vital to the outcome. The individual uses cunning, shrewdness, opportunity and a willingness to take calculated risk to achieve ones end. Nowhere in this equation
is the need for teamwork or cooperation seen as a method of mitigating risk to achieve a desired outcome. This is a concept on the opposite end of the spectrum from Western views and in particular American negotiating techniques. For Iranians, teamwork may require the individual to leave his inner circle, placing his trust in those outside his circle.
A number of observers assert that over centuries Iranian military failures resulted from mistrust and an inability to work as a team. To illustrate this concept further, some argue that the Iranian criminal underground will never be able to organize in order to perform sophisticated crime similar to that of the mafia, given it would quire trust and cooperation. This cultural trait could be useful in negotiating with Iranian as one could divide and conquer the Iranian negotiators by playing on a lack of teamwork within the team. 29 A lack of trust in others and an inability to cooperate may be one of the reasons Iranians give so much credence to conspiracy theories, which influence their dealings with world leaders. 30 Iranians tend to view world events through a prism of conspiracy theories, which focus on facts or issues that seem irrelevant to the outsider. determining an adversary's true intention. 34 The discourse is circuitous and ill defined, full of metaphors and misdirects, as it is the task of the listener to decode the speaker's true meaning. Iranians see no need for candor or frankness during discourse. In fact, some in Iranian culture perceive candor as politically incorrect and of no value. The belief among Iranians that the other party will attempt to use zerangi contributes to the overall feelings of mistrust. Indeed, some contend that Iranians are ambiguous in order to protect their pure inner being from the corrupt outer world. It is important to understand that this concept is alien to low end American cultural discourse, in which frankness and directness are very much appreciated and desired during any discussion. 35 Iranian political culture admires the clever use of ambiguity during negotiations and expects it from foreign political leaders as well. This is very different from American culture in which truth and credibility are paramount. Historically, Iranians make promises through official channels, which they do not keep once they achieve their political objectives. Iranians do not perceive these actions negatively as an Iranian adage states:
"A lie that brings benefit is preferable to a truth which causes damage." it is interesting to note, come from a cross sections of Iranian culture, and they may have representation from the Bazzari (business class), the Mullahs, or even the Revolutionary Guard Forces.
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As a part of negotiation preparations, Iranian negotiators make extensive use of back channels. There are two reasons Iranians utilize back channel contacts: the first is to minimize public scrutiny of the negotiations; and the second is to identify weaknesses and positions or fractures within the opposing team. 38 Initially Iranians will enter into detailed negotiations in an attempt to gain insight with respect to their opponent. Some argue that this technique reflects a cultural trait, which is designed to elevate the stature of the negotiator among his peers. These issues in many cases spring from tangents, which have nothing to do with the real meat of the original negotiations, but they become the focus of the negotiations. The non-Iranian side then finds that it must negotiate back to the original issue, which it has done so at a price. the hope that over time conditions would change in their favor. Typically, they asked for one-day extensions, which in actuality resulted in a two to three day delay. 41 The propensity of Iranians to delay negotiations and create time as a constraining factor contributes to the opaque nature of their style. Many have noted that while Iranians typically come well prepared to negotiate, they shy away from specific details and facts. This negotiating tactic achieves two goals: first, it draws out the length of the negotiations and secondly it confuses counterparts, which again draws out the length of the negotiations. By extending negotiations, some would say that the Iranians accept risk with the hope that conditions will improve in their favor with time. As such, Iranians attempt to mitigate risk through obfuscation and steering the negotiations away from the real issues at hand. In fact, they will look for issues that they believe will put and without class distinction, the prize went to the most resourceful and those willing to take the greatest risk. 47 In some respect, this pioneer spirit replicated the spirit of those that also took great risk when migrating to America from Europe.
Americans, although seen by many as ruthless negotiators, at the same time they are also seen as very straight forward with respect to their dealings. 48 American business/negotiating philosophy is very simple; make as much money or profit as you can in the shortest amount of time. Americans, like the rugged individuals that settled the West, do not mind going it alone and negotiators are empowered to make decisions on behalf of those they represent. American negotiators are also very upfront about the expectations they bring to the negotiating is profoundly concerned with Iran's pursuit of nuclear technologies and will explore a number of options to facilitate its peaceful pursuit of these technologies. In this sense, the U.S. would have been more culturally sensitive to its choice of words in strategic communications. Furthermore, if the U.S. were to convey this military option, the best culturally sensitive way would have been a back channel message.
The second recommendation refers to embracing the simple concept that culture complicates everything. Consequently, the U.S. must adopt a pragmatic attitude and accept there are no "cookie cutter" solutions to the issues that separate Iran and the United States. Rather, the United States must creatively and aggressively explore areas for common ground if such exists. The United States must assume that Iran will not enter into discussion with the intent of seeking the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). Iran will purposefully keep the negotiations ambiguous and opaque all the while attempting to introduce unrelated issues to the negotiations. The challenge for the United States is not to focus on the final settlement or BATNA but rather to be patient with the overall process. As discussed earlier, American culture decision makers should embrace the insights behind the four broad recommendations discussed in this paper on ways to better strategically negotiate and communicate with
Iran to achieve our nation's strategic interests.
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